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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, CASTE,. AND 
CULTURAL COMPARISONS 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
What is permitted, and what is prohibited, by the equality prin­
ciple of a liberal democracy? Does affirmative action run afoul of 
that principle? And where should we look to answer these 
questions? 
Many critics of affirmative action take it as axiomatic that af­
firmative action violates the equality principle. But this is far from 
clear. Every law classifies. The current law of equality itself classi­
fies by, for example, treating discrimination on the basis of race dif­
ferently from discrimination on the basis of age. No one thinks that 
the law of equality is, for this reason, inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause. No one thinks that constitutional doctrine gives 
a "special preference" to race discrimination. Whether affirmative 
action violates the equality principle depends on the content of that 
principle. 
There is good reason to think that the best understanding of the 
equality principle of the United States Constitution has a great deal 
to do with a prohibition on second-class citizenship, or "caste."1 
An anticaste principle can claim considerable support from the the­
ory and the practice of those who defend the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Such a principle also fits well - far from perfectly, but well 
- with the general fabric and thrust of constitutional doctrine. As 
a matter of political theory, the anticaste principle also has consid­
erable appeal, connected as it is with some of the defining ideals of 
liberal democracy, which is designed to ensure that morally irrele­
vant characteristics are not turned into a systematic basis for social 
disadvantage.2 The anticaste principle seems to serve as a promis­
ing basis for both organizing and reformulating many aspects of the 
law of equal protection. 
Of course the implications of the anticaste principle must be 
specified, and here reasonable people can differ. I have urged, for 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chi­
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1. The point is argued in Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. RE.v. 
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2. See JoHN RAwr.s, A THEORY OF JuSTICE 108-10 {1971). 
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example, that the principle forbids government from turning mor­
ally irrelevant and highly visible characteristics into a basis for sys­
temic social disadvantage. Whether or not that particular 
specification is valid, and whether or not it counts as a sufficient 
specification, it seems clear that the anticaste principle would raise 
no serious questions about affirmative action policies. The basic 
reason is that it is implausible to say that such policies entrench 
second-class citizenship. No one urges, or could urge, that such pol­
icies would make whites, or for that matter African Americans, into 
second-class citizens. This is not to say that affirmative action poli­
cies are a good idea. To be sure, they may have stigmatizing effects 
on their intended beneficiaries, and they may also increase rather 
than decrease racial antagonism. But these are essentially political 
complaints, not constitutional ones. Some people, for example, ob­
ject that affirmative action programs reflect pity and condescension 
toward African Americans3 - an interesting objection to the 
meaning and consequences of such programs, not entirely discon­
nected from the problem of second-class citizenship. But this ob­
jection, partly empirical in nature, is best heard in legislatures 
rather than courtrooms. 
Clark Cunningham and N.R. Madhava Menon have contributed 
a great deal to the debate over racial equality through their intrigu­
ing discussion of caste, and anticaste, in India. American legal de­
bates are often remarkably parochial, and the American debate 
over the anticaste principle has given strikingly little attention to 
comparative questions. This is an especially serious omission in 
light of the fact that the caste system in India seems to be a primary 
inspiration for those complaining about caste-like features of 
American life. Let me emphasize a few of the valuable points that 
Cunningham and Menon offer. First, they suggest that the Indian 
caste system operates without "highly visible" characteristics. 
High-caste Indians might look much like low-caste Indians. Sec­
ond, they suggest that in India, systemic social disadvantages began 
first, and only later created stigmatic differences to "mark the dis­
advantage." In America, the sequence was, or seems to have been, 
just the opposite. Thus, in India caste is "clearly a social construc­
tion," unlike in the United States, where it is believed that "race" is 
an immutable and obvious physical condition. 
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, India has gone down the 
route not traveled by the United States, which has adhered to the 
3. See SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED (1998). 
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view that past discrimination is sufficient justification for affir­
mative action. India has tackled with some sophistication the issue 
whether different, particular groups have different needs for affirm­
ative action. For example, the Indian government looks to various 
factors indicating group status, placing importance on whether the 
relevant unit "practices extensive endogamy, restricting marriage to 
other group members." In India, social and economic factors help 
undergird the judgment about the kind of compensatory measure to 
which members of the relevant group are entitled. 
Several features of this discussion are particularly striking. Per­
haps the most striking is the very different nature of Indian debates 
over affirmative action. While India has not avoided the high level 
of contentiousness that has characterized American debates, it has 
self-consciously gone in the direction of a highly programmatic 
method for redressing past social discrimination - an experiment 
in social engineering far beyond anything in American law. From 
the authors' description, moreover, it is unclear to what extent 
there is a widespread perception of a pervasive conflict between 
merit and affirmative action, or between liberty and equality, or of 
affirmative action as an insidious way of providing protection to a 
"special interest." 
Cunningham and Menon deserve a great deal of credit for the 
simple feat of bringing new information to bear on the debate over 
affirmative action. Too often the American debate has operated in 
a factual vacuum - a vacuum about both international and domes­
tic experience. Their new facts should spark fresh discussion. I 
would like to begin that discussion by offering three comments. 
The first involves the critical role of facts in constitutional law; the 
second involves the potential virtues of rule-free constitutional law; 
the third involves the uses and limits of comparative constitutional­
ism. The first two are inspired by what Cunningham and Menon 
have to say, but I do not directly engage their argument; in the third 
comment, I attempt to do this. 
I. FACTS RATHER THAN CONCEPTS 
Constitutional and political debates about equality and liberty 
often operate at a high level of abstraction. They raise questions, 
for example, about whether we are committed to equality of oppor­
tunity or instead equality of result, to individual rights or group 
rights, or to equality over liberty or vice-versa. Often the argu­
ments work by choosing one concept over another, by assembling 
some particular practice that is said to tell, decisively, against a cer-
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tain claim or alleged principle (for example, the generally accepted 
preferential treatment given to children of alumni), by suggesting 
that a certain concept necessarily means a certain thing (as in the 
view that equality necessarily forbids, or requires, affirmative ac­
tion), or by specifying a concept with the suggestion that this, rather 
than that, is the best specification (perhaps because it fits better 
with the rest of what we believe). 
These debates, though common and frequently illuminating, 
often seem hopelessly conceptual and interminable, stylized, a form 
of Kabuki theater; often no one is convinced at all, and, even worse, 
often no one learns anything. I think that a great deal of further 
progress might be made by learning more about the facts. It is very 
hard to know where to stand on affirmative action programs with­
out investigating some empirical questions. What do such programs 
look like? How do they differ? The term "affirmative action" is 
extremely broad, and it covers a wide range of activities in the pri­
vate and public sectors and at the national, state, and local levels. 
Do such programs actually stigmatize people, and if so in what 
sense? These are empirical questions, not (only) conceptual ones. 
And what are the actual differences in qualification between the 
programs' beneficiaries and their victims, and how much difference 
do these differences make? What would happen if affirmative ac­
tion programs were abolished? What would happen if some alter­
native short of affirmative action were adopted, such as wealth­
based admissions judgments? What are the effects of affirmative 
action programs for their intended beneficiaries in, for example, 
college, medical school, and law school? Do such programs make 
people better off, and if so in what sense?4 
These questions are important because when progress cannot be 
made on conceptual matters or on issues in high-level theory, it 
might instead be made by investigating facts. This is the great 
promise of empirical work: to enable progress and even closure 
when conceptual debates produce uncertainty, holy wars, or blank 
stares. I hypothesize, for example, that many people would be 
skeptical of affirmative action programs to the extent that the rec­
ord shows that they involve hiring people whose qualifications are 
not marginally lower, but actually much lower than those of their 
(majority group) competitors. It also seems likely that many critics 
of affirmative action would be less critical if it appeared that the 
4. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BoK, THE SHAPE OF TIIB RIVER (1998), for what 
seems to me to be the most valuable contribution to the affirmative action debate in the last 
decade. 
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abolition of affirmative action would mean that only a handful of 
African Americans would be able to attend the major law schools. 
When people disagree on high principle, they can often be 
brought into agreement, or at least make progress, if they investi­
gate the facts.5 In the context of affirmative action we need much 
more in the way of facts. A Supreme Court brief dealing with the 
consequences of a principle of colorblindness would be far more 
helpful than a brief quoting from past cases and pushing conceptual 
arguments one way rather than another. The discussion by 
Cunningham and Menon is very much in this spirit insofar as com­
parative work brings actual experience to bear on equality claims. 
II. AGAINST RuLES, AGAINST JumcIAL REsoLUTIONs6 
It is tempting to think that the Supreme Court has erred in 
maintaining its casuistical, rule-free, fact-specific course in the con­
text of affirmative action. This course might well seem to represent 
a failure of the rule of law. But there are good reasons for the 
Court to have followed this path. No clear constitutional commit­
ment forbids affirmative action programs; as a matter of text and 
history, the attack on such programs is remarkably weak.7 It is im­
perative that constitutional law not be used to strike down political 
judgments about which reasonable people differ and to which the 
Constitution does not clearly speak - especially in light of the ab­
sence of much factual knowledge by the judiciary of domestic or 
international experiences with affirmative action. My emphasis on 
the centrality of facts to the legal question is thus a reason for cau­
tion from the judiciary, which ought not to invoke a controversial 
reading of the Constitution when it is at least possible that a good 
understanding of the facts would lead in another direction. 
At the same time, it would be wrong to celebrate the democratic 
character of the institutions that have adopted affirmative action 
programs. On the contrary, the nation has not, until recently, had 
much of a debate about affirmative action, and some of the relevant 
programs have been adopted with far too little deliberation and far 
too little democracy. In these circumstances, the Court has 
adopted, perhaps by inadvertence, an intriguing alternative to the 
three conventional options of validation, invalidation, and denial of 
certiorari. That alternative consists of rulings that draw sharp at-
5. Thus facts are a great ally, and a potential part, of incompletely specified agreements. 
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996). 
6. I borrow here from CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 117-36 (1999). 
7. See id. at 125-29. 
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tention to underlying questions of policy and principle - which ac­
tivates political debate - but that do not displace public discussion 
and that leave a great deal undecided. This may well be taken as a 
democratic approach to judicial review, one that falls in the basic 
category of representation-reinforcement. 
I think that Cunningham and Menon fortify this basic point. 
They show that any simple solution to the problem may overlook 
the wide range of possible approaches, and their investigation of 
India reveals that a nation in some ways like our own has ap­
proached the issue quite differently. We need much more work of 
this kind in constitutional law. A judicial foreclosure of experimen­
tation informed by international experience may well be hopelessly 
parochial. The point applies not only to the law of equality, but 
also to other areas of constitutional law; the approach to libel law, 
for example, may well be improved by seeing how other nations do 
things. 
ill. Noms ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the discussion by 
Cunningham and Menon involves its depiction of a path not taken 
by the United States. Recall that India maintains a list of 3,500 
"backward classes" and that empirical factors, including social dis­
crimination, educational deprivation, and economic status, are used 
to determine group status. Some groups - the most disadvantaged 
- have their own independent quotas, generally proportional to 
population. Other groups also receive a reserve, but one smaller 
than their population share. Individual entitlements may depend 
on whether the relevant individuals have been raised in privileged 
circumstances. Thus there is a careful, elaborate, and quite refined 
method for determining how government policies will counteract or 
even dismantle the system of caste. India appears, in short, to be 
engaged in a process of social engineering that goes well beyond 
anything in American practice. 
A full assessment of India's program would require answers to 
two questions: (1) Does the Indian approach make sense for India? 
(2) Would that approach, or some variation on that approach, make 
sense for the United States? I cannot attempt a full assessment 
here, but let me venture a few puzzles and thoughts. The first ques­
tion itself raises several questions. 
Does this kind of close attention to caste background increase 
or decrease social antagonism? Trmur Kuran has written of the 
dangers of "ethnification," in which small shocks to a system can 
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create widespread consciousness of ascriptive (or other) differ­
ences, in a way that eventually causes segregation, resentment, ha­
tred, and even violence.8 Is there any similar problem in India? 
Cunningham and Menon suggest the possibility of an affirmative 
answer. A great risk of race-conscious or ethnicity-conscious poli­
cies is that they can heighten attention to questions of race and 
ethnicity in a way that compromises social cohesion. (Of course 
social cohesion is not the only social goal, and may not be in good 
shape in the first instance.) 
Does the system create, or is it perceived to create, a kind of 
caste spoils system? Judgments about the degree of disadvantage 
are hardly a purely scientific enterprise, and controversial judg­
ments are likely to enter into any decision about who counts as suf­
ficiently disadvantaged. There is also a natural risk here of strategic 
and self-interested behavior, in which groups jockey with one an­
other for position as "most disadvantaged," with harmful conse­
quences for society as a whole. Nor is it an unambiguous good if 
members of one or another group play the game of "more victim­
ized than thou." Does this happen in India? 
Does this system significantly weaken the Indian economy? 
Does it compromise performance-related goals, and if so to what 
extent? It is surely imaginable that such a system might compro­
mise merit, rightly conceived (though of course this is a contestable 
ideal). From what Cunningham and Menon have said, however, 
there is no clear answer to this question. 
The fact that India seems to have arrived at its approach 
through something close to agreement (if that is a fact) is extremely 
illuminating, but it is not by itself a sufficient reason to think that 
the approach is justified. It would be helpful if Cunningham and 
Menon would, in the future, say a bit more about the above ques­
tions. Their current discussion focuses more on describing the In­
dian practice than on demonstrating its success, or even on 
identifying the criteria by which success or failure might be 
measured. 
What about America? Cunningham and Menon appear to be­
lieve that America should have taken the road suggested by some 
Justices in Bakke: that is, the Court should have allowed the polit­
ical branches to conclude that past social discrimination is sufficient 
8. See Tllllur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cas­
cades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998). 
1318 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1311 
to justify affirmative action programs.9 I very much agree with this 
judgment: if the nation, or a state, would like to compensate for the 
continuing effects of past discrimination, there should be no consti­
tutional problem so long as the program is reasonably well-tailored. 
The Court should have allowed the government room to maneuver 
in this way, and future courts should allow the democratic process 
to handle this sharply contested issue in any reasonable manner.10 
But the further question remains: Should the political process in 
America attempt to do something like what India has done? 
The most obvious response is that this is a genuinely academic 
question. There is no possibility that the United States would at­
tempt to identify the fifty groups, let alone the 3,500 groups, which 
ought to qualify as backward classes. But as in India, the existence 
of a political consensus or obstacle cannot be decisive; perhaps the 
consensus or obstacle is wrong. Our own anticaste principle, re­
flected in our history and our practices, seems to emphasize highly 
visible identifying characteristics (most notably race and gender), 
on the theory that such characteristics present the greatest opportu­
nities for unjustified and pervasive subordination. The anticaste 
idea builds narrowly from the cases of African Americans to pick 
up women and the handicapped (with a partial, limited inclusion of 
homosexuals). This limitation is not entirely without appeal. A de­
cent society does not humiliate its members,11 and humiliation is 
especially likely when the government discriminates against people 
whose characteristics are highly visible. (Of course it is not limited 
to those cases.) 
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, it is easiest to main­
tain a caste society, even when market forces are quite vigorous, 
when the characteristics that lead to lower-caste status are highly 
visible. It is in such circumstances that customers and coworkers 
can most easily entrench existing inequality.12 It is in such circum­
stances that rational discrimination may result in the use of sex and 
race as proxies. And it is in such circumstances that screening strat-
9. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 344 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, 
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
10. It follows that the decision of the court of appeals in Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), was a mistake, indeed a form of hubris; a lower court should not 
forbid educational institutions from proceeding in this way without a much clearer signal 
from the Supreme Court. 
11. See the excellent discussion in AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi 
Goldblum trans., 1996). 
12. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BooK OF TALES 23·44 (1984); 
Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes 
for Minority Workers, 113 QJ. EcoN. 835 (1998). 
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egies may perpetuate social subordination.13 Market forces are es­
pecially unpromising correctives to caste-like aspects of society 
when a highly visible characteristic is at work in the context of sys­
temic social disadvantages. 
None of these points suggests that this limited anticaste princi­
ple, understood by reference to American understandings and ex­
periences, is ideal, even for America. Surely the anticaste principle 
does not exhaust the content of the notion of equality. At a mini­
mum, there is also a place for an antidiscrimination principle, for 
fair equality of opportunity (an idea that cuts very broadly), and for 
programs of redistribution designed to ensure that everyone lives in 
minimally decent conditions. These ideas overlap with the anticaste 
principle but are independent of it. It is even possible to think that 
the three ideas would do most of the good work done by the anti­
caste efforts in India, perhaps more successfully. Thus, for example, 
I might speculate that an effort to ensure fair equality of opportu­
nity, and minimally decent conditions for all, bears something of the 
same relation to the Indian experience as a negative income tax 
bears to minimum wage legislation. A negative income tax is a far 
more effective and direct way of assisting the poor than a minimum 
wage increase.14 So too, an insistence on fair equality of opportu­
nity and minimally decent conditions might well be a far more ef­
fective and direct way of dealing with systemic disadvantages than 
India's extremely complex affirmative action program. 
For America, with its very different history, a large question is 
whether a limited anticaste principle, suitably supplemented with 
these other ideals, is not a better approach to the problem of in­
equality than an approach that would attempt compensatory mea­
sures for a wide range of socially disadvantaged groups. It is even 
possible to wonder whether India might not have done better to 
adopt a narrower anticaste principle for the most disadvantaged 
groups, and to attempt to promote other equality goals with other 
policies, including better education and job training, and minimal 
economic and social guarantees for all, ensuring against desperate 
conditions.15 But it is very hard to disentangle this normative judg­
ment from an awareness of political and cultural understandings, 
which obviously diverge between India and America, perhaps espe-
13. See Bradford Cornell & lvo Welch, Customs, Information, and Screening Discrimina­
tion, 104 J. PoL. EcoN. 542 (1996). 
14. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal 
Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 405 (1997). 
15. Cf. INDIAN DEVELOPMENT (Jean Dreze & Amartya Sen eds., 1997). 
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cially so in their different conceptions of what it means to undo a 
system of caste. 
CONCLUSION 
For constitutional purposes, the American equality principle has 
been an anticaste principle - one that forbids government from 
turning a morally irrelevant and highly visible characteristic into a 
systemic basis for second-class citizenship. This principle ought not 
to be taken to authorize federal judges to invalidate reasonable af­
firmative action programs. The appropriate content of such pro­
grams should be a democratic rather than a judicial responsibility; 
the most extreme judicial attacks on affirmative action programs 
are a form of hubris. 
On the other hand, we know far too little to declare that our 
current programs are working well. There are two promising paths 
for the future, both of them involving facts. The first is to learn a 
great deal more about the operations, achievements, and failures of 
multiple approaches, race-conscious and otherwise, and to see 
which of them provides a good model for the future.16 The second 
is to see what might be learned from the experience of other na­
tions. The analysis provided by Cunningham and Menon offers no 
unambiguous lessons for the United States, but it offers a great deal 
of illumination about our possibilities and prospects. 
16. For an excellent model in this regard, see BoWEN & BoK, supra note 4. 
